The Decline of American Soft Power: the United States’ Weakest Point to Defeat Terrorism

“The Decline of American Soft Power: The United States’ Weakest Point to Defeat Terrorism”, the 7th Annual National Academic Conference on Political Science and Public Administration, ‘Freedom, Power, Ethics, and Thai Politics’ hosted by Ramkhamhaeng University, Thailand, 27-29 November 2006.

Abstract
After the Cold War, the United States was placed as the pre-eminent power in the world. Undoubtedly, President George W. Bush’s neoconservative foreign affairs and defense policies have been focused on pre-emption, unilateralism, and hegemony.[1]The consequences of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and also in Iraq have shown an image of an “American world empire” in the international order.[2] However, since the United States and its alliance have intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq, uncertain situations still occur. No one can guarantee when the war will be end. Critics say that these outcomes have proved that the United States foreign policy attempts have been unsuccessful.
Winning the war on terrorism will require a new approach. The problem is that the United States cannot focus only on using military power to defeat terrorist threats and democratize Afghanistan and Iraq, but will also need to win the “war of ideas” or psychological warfare.[3] Therefore, it can be argued that to win the “long war”, the United States is required to revise its power and make the right balance between such “soft power” resources and American “hard power” capabilities. As Joseph S. Nye[4] has stated, “Smart power is neither hard nor soft. It is both.”[5]

On September 11, 2001, the attack was the deadliest terrorist action ever in American history. The United States was now a very vulnerable target for terrorist attacks in ways it had not been before.[6]
The Bush Administration declared a global war on terrorism, with the stated goals of bringing Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to justice and preventing the emergence of other terrorist networks. In October 2001, the first operation outside of the United States was the invasion of Afghanistan, by a United States-led coalition. Following on from this, the United States government started the war on Iraq in March 2003.[7]
Without significant assistance from other countries, the United States attacks have, indeed, confirmed the perception of American global hegemon. However, the United States realizes that the war on terrorism is a “long war,”[8] as Bush has himself mentioned that “Our own generation is in a long war against a determined enemy.”[9]
Even though the Bush Administration repeatedly declared its commitment to achieve victory in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the results of current policy there are not encouraging.[10] After four years, the United States has made slow progress in providing a stable environment in both countries. It is obvious that the degree of violence in both countries has been increasing.[11]
The critical question is why America’s military superiority has failed in winning the peace. As Nye put it, “Winning the peace is harder than winning a war and soft power is essential to winning the peace. Yet the way we went to war in Iraq proved to be as costly for our soft power as it was a stunning victory for our hard power.”[12]
What is soft power? It refers to national power that comes from diplomacy, culture, political ideas, and policies. Nye describes soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” He explains further that “When you get others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction.”[13] There is no doubt that when the American foreign policies are seen as legitimate in other people’s judgments, soft power is enhanced.[14]
On the other hand, the definition of hard power is described by Nye as, “the ability to coerce, grow out of a country’s military and economic might.”[15] As the super power state in the twentieth century since the September 11 attacks, Bush has focused greatly on pre-emption, unilateralism, and hegemony. The United States used its power to set up “the war on terror” as the international agenda and compel others to accept and follow the American way.[16] Bush took a doctrine of pre-emption and moved decisively to Iraq. He depended on ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” to gain support abroad and overlooked permanent alliances.[17] Those means are sources of American hard power.
After 9/11 the Bush Administration directly and indirectly ignored the role of soft power. The United States overlooked the importance of soft power in term of credibility and legitimacy, with the result that many people felt the need to go against the American unilateralism, which is described as “anti-Americanism.” Nye argues that it is a mistake.[18]
This essay looks at the United States foreign policy, the neoconservatism of the Bush Administration, the decline of American legitimacy and the failure of making the world admire “American benevolent hegemony.”[19] It will also criticize the United States’ failure in incorporating soft power in national strategy and the unsuccessful use of the “doctrine of pre-emptive action” in the Afghanistan and the Iraq wars. The United States cannot win the war on terrorism by relying heavily on its hard power.[20]
American Hard Power: Bush Doctrine
During their first eight months in office, Bush and his colleagues agreed that the United States often had to act on its own and that the military forces should be used only to protect vital American national interests. The missions of humanitarian interventions should be left to others.[21]
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, some implementations of the United States’ foreign policies were changed in several elements. The United States’ primary mission is to defeat terrorism.[22] Undoubtedly, the Bush administration’s policies have been focused on pre-emption, unilateralism, and hegemony, which are described as hard power.[23]
The Bush doctrine is the framework of American foreign policies in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In September 2002, the doctrine is described in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and consistent with its hegemonist perception, the Bush Administration put American power at the center of its national security blueprint. The core of the Bush’s strategy, therefore, was to use America’s unprecedented power to define the world in its own image.[24]
The Bush doctrine can be summed up by saying that the United States would begin periodic preventive wars to defend itself against terrorists, especially when linked to tyrannical regimes and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).[25] The instant application of the Bush doctrine was the invasion of Afghanistan, followed by the Iraq War.
Unilateralism
Bush has demonstrated the clear perception of unilateralism since he came to be the President. The United States depended deeply on the unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and institutions to get its way.[26] Bush regarded the United Nations as an “entirely instrumental light.” If it were functional in securing wider support for the contemplated achievement, the Bush Administration was willing to work through it. Evidently, the United States decisions demonstrated that it did not give the nod to the United Nations.[27] For instance, the United States has rejected initiatives on climate change and the trade in small arms. America withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in December 2001 and blocked international efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, even though the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States clearly confirmed the dangers of biological terrorism.[28] In 2002, the Bush Administration withdrew from a treaty to establish an International Criminal Court (ICC).[29] Worst of all, the United States determined to overthrow Saddam Hussein despite widespread opposition within the international community. The result has been severely destroyed American legitimacy.[30]
Undoubtedly, the United States is the world’s only military superpower. It also remains the world’s mightiest country in economic terms. Neoconservatives insist that the United States should use its power to seek “unilateral solutions” if this is in its national interest.[31] Robert Kagan, an American neoconservative scholar, views multilateralism as “the weapon of the weak.” Walter Laqueur, an American historian and political commentator, recommended the Bush Administration “stands tall and brazen out the infidels.”[32] In addition, Richard Perle, who served as Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee in the Bush Administration, cited that “[We have to] reshape fundamental attitudes towards international norms, or we are going to have our hands tied by an antiquated international system that is not capable of defending us.”[33]
The neoconservative scholars also believe that the United States should sustain its position as hegemon and prevent the emergence of any challengers to its power.[34] The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think tank, pointed out that America’s aim is to “shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests” by making certain that there is no superpower emerging to compete with the United States and prolong American influence around the world.[35]
Charles Krauthammer, Washington Post and Time Magazine columnist, is a supporter of unilateralism and suggests that in the unipolar world, the United States government should affirm its position as a superpower and invite others to join. He does not believe that “legitimacy derives from international consensus”[36] and has articulated “a new type of realism” by stating that “Unilateralism is the high road to multilateralism … No one wants to be left on the dock when the hegemon is sailing.”[37] He has also advocated that the best way to defend American interests and spread democracy is through the United States foreign policy, which should be a combination of realist and neoconservative approaches.[38]
Krauthammer’s dissertation differs from the analysis of Francis Fukuyama, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University, who disagreed with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and called for Donald Rumsfeld to resign as Secretary of Defense.[39] Fukuyama strongly criticized the invasion and identified neoconservatism with “Leninism.” The neoconservatives believed that history could be pushed along with the right application of power and will. In contrast, Fukuyama argued that Leninism was a tragedy in its Bolshevik version, and it has returned as farce when practiced by the United States.[40]
Fukuyama argued that the United States spends as much on its military as the rest of the world put together, but an uncertain situation in Iraq shows the limitation of American military’s effectiveness.[41] He pointed out that the Bush Administration made three major mistakes. Firstly, the United States overestimated the threat of radical Islamism. Secondly, the Bush Administration did not anticipate the fierce negative feedback on its benevolent hegemony coming. Since Bush became President, he has shown a negative attitude towards the United Nations and other international organizations. This is why there has been an increasing “anti-Americanism” in other countries. Thirdly, the Bush Administration misjudged what was needed to bring peace in Iraq and was exceedingly optimistic about the success of “social engineering” which could be applied to Iraq and the Middle East as a general rule.[42]
Similarly, David Hendrickson, a professor at Colorado College, described the Bush doctrine as a “quest for absolute security.” Hendrickson argued that unilateralism and a strategic doctrine of preventive war were “momentous steps” standing in “direct antagonism to fundamental values in our political tradition,” which threaten “to wreck an international order that has been patiently built up for 50 years, inviting a fundamental delegitimation of American power.”[43] Hendrickson quoted Henry Kissinger’s words that sum up the mistake in a search for absolute security, “The desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all the others.”[44] As John Lewis Gaddis, a professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University, asserted, “Unilateralism impression is misleading.”[45]
Another criticism that has been raised is that the Bush doctrine and the Iraq war show that the United States would and could take action against the liberal internationalist norms.[46] Robert Jervis, a professor of International Politics at Columbia University, pointed out that “The basic unilateralism of the United States’ behavior that goes with assertive hegemony as exemplified by the war in Iraq has strained the alliance bonds in a way that can make fighting terrorism more difficult.[47]
In short, these opponents of neoconservatism strongly believe that unilateralism will not serve American interests in a long term. The United States must consider the effects of excessive unilateral policy on its legitimacy. Countering such terrorist groups still depends on maintaining American military strength. However, the United States must understand how to combine its hard power with its legitimacy in the pursuit of national and global interests.[48]
It is true that there is no large country can afford to be purely multilateralist, but the United States should incline toward multilateralism whenever possible as a way to legitimize its power and to gain broad acceptance of its strategy.[49] For example, multinational force and administration in Iraq may be less competent than a United States force, but what the United States loses in efficiency it more than gains in legitimacy and in the defense of its soft power.[50]
Pre-emptive action
After September 2001, the Bush Administration pointed out that terrorists and the rogue states have attempted to attack the United States again by using weapons of mass destruction. As a result, America declared its intention to act pre-emptively.[51] “Pre-emptive action” was recognized as a specific way to win the war against terrorists. The concept of pre-emptive action is to eradicate possible aggressors or threats before they are capable of attacking the United States’ interests. [52] The United States Department of Defense’s “Dictionary of Military Terms” defines pre-emptive action as “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”[53] In the National Security Strategy 2002, pre-emptive action is cited as a critical sentence that states that “We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists.”[54]
The full extent of Bush’s pre-emptive action became apparent at West Point on June 2002. Bush called for new thinking to match new threats. He claimed that the old Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment were no longer enough for defending the United States.[55] As Bush concluded that the nation’s “security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”[56]
The instant application of the pre-emptive action was the invasion of Afghanistan, followed by the Iraq War. The Bush Administration stated, “Weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states.”[57] Paul Wolfowitz, who served as a Deputy Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2005 and has continued to support pre-emption policy, clarified his point that
You cannot wait until you have evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that somebody did something in the past, you know that people are planning to do something against you in the future and that they are developing incredibly destructive weapons to do it with and that is not tolerable. [58]
Neoconservatives insist that preventive war is required to protect American interests. In the war on terrorism, the United States could not count on others to protect them because other countries inevitably ignored threats that did not involved them.[59] The United States would henceforth act with a multilateral approach where possible, but unilateral where necessary; to attack terrorists before they could hit their intended targets.[60]
Clearly, Bush summarized this policy with the strong assertion of American hegemony that “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”[61] This statement implies that any country that does not take a proactive approach with the United States against the terrorists would be seen as supporting the terrorists.
In contrast, opponents of neoconservatives blame the Bush Administration of acting unilaterally and superciliously and thereby alienating its allies.[62] They claimed that even the United States guarantees other nations that it will use military strikes only when the cause is just and the justifications for action clear, however, it can only be assumed that the United States by itself is the judge of the legitimacy of its own or others’ attacks.[63]
As Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, argued, “it cannot be in either the American national interest or the world’s interest to develop the principle that grants every nation an unfettered right of pre-emption against its own definition of threats to its security.”[64] The strategy recognized this problem by warning nations not to “use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression.” [65] The Bush administration, however, did not distinguish what separated pre-emption from unlawful aggression. Without a clear standard, the administration ran the risk that its concept would be used to justify the ends it opposed. [66]
Democracy Promotion
After the Cold War, the principle of democracy is widely accepted. It is believed that “the advance of democracy leads to peace, because governments that respect the rights of their people also respect the rights of their neighbors.”[67] The United States, recognized as a leader of Western liberal democracy, insists to bring about human rights, freedom and democracy around the world. As Bush declared, he has his faith in the ability of liberty to transform societies and convert a hostile world into a peaceful world.[68]
Clearly, the Bush Administration has established the principle of democracy at the core of the Bush doctrine. As Bush has eloquently said, most clearly in his second inaugural address, evil regimes can no longer be tolerated. In his words, “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in the world.”[69] In practice, however, the United States has focused almost entirely on the Middle East, with little mention of East and Central Asia and almost none of Africa, Latin America, and even Mexico.[70]
In the war on terrorism, extending democracy to undemocratic countries is recognized as an enduring solution to the terrorist problem.[71] The United States has seriously focused on establishing democracy in the Middle East as a primary means to defeat the networks of Al Qaeda.[72] Bush expects that “the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups.” [73]
Moreover, the Bush Administration asserts that democracy promotions in the Middle East not only spread American values but also improve the United States security.[74] Bush also believes in the notion of “domino democracy,” that more democracies will mean greater stabilities and peaceful relations with neighbors.[75]
The concept of regime change was not new to American foreign policy. Dwight D. Eisenhower contrived the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed of Iran, Ronald Reagan supported armed opponents of Nicaragua’s Sandinista Junta, and Bill Clinton helped Serb opposition to subvert Slobodan Milosevic. In contrast, the difference in the Bush Administration was the willingness to use its military power to get rid of other governments, based on the belief that America could go it alone not in diplomacy or treaties.[76] Bush implied that these tasks would be undertaken with the help of others if possible, but without them if necessary.[77] For this reason, there are three logical problems with the argument supporting the United States push for democracy in Middle East as part of the war on terrorism.
Firstly, there is no clear evidence that democracy promotion can be a principal means of fighting terrorism. As the Patterns of Global Terrorism report, published by the United States Department of State, has found, between 2000 and 2003 more terrorist activity had in fact taken place in free countries compared to partly free or not free ones.[78] This is why the notion that “democracy can stop terrorism” lacks a pragmatic support.[79]
Secondly, the Bush Administration assumption overestimated that democracy can simply be installed by force in other countries. Bush and his team expected that American military power could be used to export democracy in Iraq and transform the politics in the Middle East. The principles of democracy, however, are so complicated.[80] It cannot be imposed by force.[81] In many counties, the governments and societies have spent hundreds of years evolving their own democratic system. As Bruce Russett, Director of United Nations Studies at Yale University, insisted,
Most democratic peace theorists do not endorse democratic regime change by great power external military intervention … a simple correlation between military intervention and subsequent democratization would be deceptive.” [82]
In Russett’s article, a study of ninety American military interventions from 1898 to 1992 found that 85 percent of the interventions did not promote democracy. Russett concluded that military interventions have sometime installed democracies by force, but they have failed more often than not. In the case of the Iraq war, the probabilities and costs of failure, as in a full scale civil war and incubator of terrorism, is huge.[83]
In addition, Chris Forster argued that the Bush Administration assumes democracy in Middle East is a “simplified construction” and terrorism a “single entity.”[84] In cases of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, both countries have held national elections under the supervision of international institutions. Evidently, an attempt at democratization has made slow progress in discouraging terrorists from operating there. Yet both have been under the influence of terrorist attacks since.[85]
Thirdly, using military force without legitimacy to democratize other states brings about the “campaigns of hatred.”[86] As Noam Chomsky, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, commented, “The United States is recognized by much of the world as a leading terrorist state and with good reason.”[87]
The United States may indeed be more powerful, in terms of military force, than ever before. In 2005 the United States’ expenditure on defense was as much as all 191 other countries combined.[88] The regime change in Iraq demonstrated that any opponent who dared to go against American power would be disciplined by using military force, even in the face of disapproval by the United Nations and the absence of banned weapons. The Bush Administration did not care a fig for whether the Iraq war was lawful.[89]
On the other hand, American power does not necessarily equal American influence. The neoconservatives overlook American legitimacy, which is an intrinsic aspect of true power.[90] The continued bloodletting in Afghanistan and Iraq have confirmed that the United States, the most powerful state in the world, failed to achieve its goals in building democracy in other nations. The Bush Administration’s approach to dealing with terrorist threats by promoting democracy had clearly overreached itself. [91]
Although the United States is pre-eminent, it is not omnipotent. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a philosopher of the Enlightenment whose political ideas influenced the French Revolution, remarked, “the strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty.”[92]
Anti-Americanism
As a consequence of the Bush doctrine with the powerful assertion of American hegemony, a strongly sense of distrust against the United States’ legitimacy has rapidly grown. The United States is losing its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, and therefore its ability to attract others.[93]
For instance, while the United Stated insists on working with others to prevent the development of nuclear weapons, the National Strategic defense of the United States contains the enhancement of presented nuclear infrastructure.[94] It demonstrates the idea of “American exceptionalism,” that America could use its power in instances where others could not because it was more virtuous than other countries.[95] Mohamed Elbaradei, former director general of the International Atomic Energy Authority, pointed out that the position of the United States on WMD is “double standard.” As he cited,
We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.[96]
After the 2003 invasion of Iraq without the United Nations’ approval, distrust towards American foreign policy tends to fester and further reduce American leverage. Moreover, critics point to incidents such as the alleged use of chemical weapons against residents of Fallujah, and the use of military force to disperse anti-American demonstrations in Iraq. Even worse, the United States forces violate international Geneva Conventions in events such as the torture and prisoner abuse scandal in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,[97] Bagram, Afghanistan,[98] and Abu Ghraib, Iraq.[99] As a result, the legitimacy of United States power has vanished entirely. This is why the United States has failed to convince others to accept American legitimacy. Many people now believe that if American military act immorally or unethically then they are no better people than the “insurgents” they are trying to find.[100]
It is patently obvious that levels of anti-Americanism sentiment across the world have risen significantly. Confidence in American propriety and purposes has dropped precipitously and shows little sign of recovery.[101] As the Gallup International poll found, “Pluralities in 29 countries say that Washington’s policies have had a negative effect on their view of the United States.”[102] Jervis pin pointed that “American power, then, produces American vulnerability.”[103] Moreover, in many countries the United States is now seen as a major threat to peace.[104]
Many Europeans already believed that the Iraq war had undermined the struggle against terrorists and doubted the Bush Administration’s sincerity in trying to combat terrorism.[105] In 2004 the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that a majority of people interviewed in France and Germany, two traditional American allies, expressed widespread disbelief about the reasons the United States presented for going to war, such as the assumed correlation of Iraq to September 11, 2001 and the imminence of the threat of weapons of mass destruction.[106]
Turning to the Middle East, the United States’ failure to find significant evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction has spurred widespread debate about the real intention of the war. Some have argued that the invasion of Iraq was intended primarily to stabilize and better control the Middle East, the world’s oil supplies.[107] For example, on one Al Jazeera program, a running survey tallied votes on the problem, “Is the United States acting as an imperialist power in Iraq?” 96 percent of voters said yes. In some predominantly Muslim countries, pessimistic perception in terms of anger rather than hatred toward American policy has prevailed for years. The Bush policy in Iraq generates more hatred of America amongst the Islamic community.[108] The survey of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found, people in Jordan, Pakistan and Morocco felt that the suicide bombings against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq were justified.[109] This can explain why the war on terrorism and conflicts with Afghanistan and Iraq are getting worse.
It is so obvious why the United States is hated. It is not because of what Americans are, but rather what American did. Much of the world still buys into liberal internationalism. According to the July 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Project survey, even in Muslim countries such as Lebanon, Morocco, and Pakistan, most people believe that Western-style democracy could work well for them.[110] Similarly, the first of the United Nations Development Program’s two Arab Human Development reports, which contained a poll asking whether respondents would like to emigrate to the United States if they had the opportunity. A majority of respondents said yes. In contrast, recent Pew surveys of global public opinion show that positive feelings about the United States in Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and other supposedly friendly Muslim countries has sunk to disastrously low levels. These data has shown that for the board mass of public opinion in Muslim countries either dislike or hate the United States’ values. What they dislike about American is its foreign policies.[111]
Anti-Americanism has demonstrated the critical decline of the United States’ soft power; however, Bush and his advisers did not pay much concern about American’s unfavorable image in other countries. They also misunderstood the way the world would react to the use of American power.[112] They deeply held conviction that the United States was a uniquely just nation and was seen aboard as being so.[113] As Bush said, “I am amazed that there is such misunderstanding of what our country is about…Like most Americans, I just cannot believe it. Because I know how good we are.”[114] Moreover, Bush and his team expressed surprise at foreign resentment or even growing fear of American power. As Condoleezza Rice, United States Secretary of State, has told, “There were times that it appeared that American power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein ...I will just put it very bluntly. We simply did not understand it.”[115] It is evident that the American leaders did not understand the crucial importance of soft power.[116] As Newt Gingrich, former House Speaker, observed about the Bush Administration’s approach in the Iraq war, “The real key is not how many enemy do I kill. The real key is how many allies do I grow, and that is a very important metric that they {the Bush Administration} just do not get it.”[117]
The consequence of anti-Americanism means that the war on terrorism going to get worse. Unsurprising, Bush and his team have launched the revised vision of the National Security Strategy in 2006. The report sets out a plan for executing what the Pentagon describes in the preface as the “long war”, which replaces the “war on terror.”[118]
The Long War
Without doubt, the United States possesses unrivaled power in the world, particularly its military power. The victories in beating the Taliban regime, Saddam Hussein, and the setting up of the democratized government might be considered strategic successes of the United States.
In contrast, American power is far less effective in building a lasting basis of peace, stability, and prosperity. The situations in Iraq and Afghanistan remain very doubtful and uncertain, with bombing and ground fighting still unending. In Afghanistan, United States armed forces may have subdued the Taliban regime, but so far, they cannot destroy a transnational network of Al Qaeda, which has formed in 60 countries.[119]
The United Sates has promised a better future for all Iraqi. However, the gap between its promise and the deteriorating security situation in Iraq became formidable.[120] Even through Saddam has been found, suicide bombs are part of every day life.[121] Daily, innocent civilian are killed cruelly by the terrorist attacks. In December 2005, in Bush’s words, about 30,000 Iraqis had been killed since the war began, whereas the report of the campaign group Iraq Body Count in May 2006 has shown the total number of civilian dead at 34,830 to 38,990.[122]
Moreover, antagonism toward American foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan has hardened.[123] After the invasion of Iraq without the United Nations’ authority, without evidence of an ongoing nuclear weapons program, and no stocks of chemical or biological weapons in Iraq, a climate of conspiracy theories about the American intervention in Iraq war has flourished.[124] Particularly, the atrocities in Afghanistan and Iraq shocked the United States into an understanding that they had better pay much closer attention to how the United States foreign policy affects the world and how it is perceived.[125]
The appeal of “American isolationism” and the awkwardness of “American interventionism” damaged the United States’ efforts in the vital arena of winning the war of ideas. As a result, Bin Laden took this opportunity to recruit a new wave of Islamic extremists, fighting the United States. As Jervis mentioned,
The [American] occupation has recruited large numbers of people to the terrorist cause. Although evidence, let alone proof, is of course elusive, it is hard to avoid the inference that the war has created more terrorists than it has killed, has weakened the resolve of others to combat them, and has increased the chance of major attacks against the West.[126]
Richard A. Clarke, former the United States national security advisor and the author of Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, also pointed out that,
Bin Laden had been producing propaganda saying that America wants to invade an Arab country and occupy it, an oil-rich Arab country. So what did we do after 9/11? We invade an oil-rich and occupy an oil-rich Arab country which was doing nothing to threaten us. In other words, we stepped right into Bin Laden’s propaganda … it is not surprising that Al Qaeda and its offshoots are having much greater success recruiting new members.[127]
If we measure strategic failure in term of the uncertain situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, then it can be argued that the United States’ strategy continues to be unsuccessful.[128] The critical question is not whether the United States made little progress in the short run, but whether it can enhance the security, prosperity, and liberty of the American national interest in the long term.[129]
Win the war of ideas
After the World War II, when American emerged as the predominant power in the world, Franklin Roosevelt and Henry Truman chose international institutions as a crucial means to exert American’ s authority. They supported to establish the United Nations for building international peace and security, set up the Bretton Woods system to alleviate world economic crisis, and spent huge funds helping rebuild devastated countries. American not only won the war, but also made the twentieth century as “the American century.” [130] In the latter half of the twentieth century, as a result of the Marshall Plan in Europe, American made a success in exporting its values, represented by federalism, democracy and open markets.[131]
During the Gulf War, the United States was keenly aware of the importance of respecting the international body’s opinion. The successful exercise of hard power pointed to the rise of American prestige because a broad coalition of the United Nations supported.[132] Even George H.W. Bush declared in the aftermath of the Gulf War that he possessed the authority to go the war without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council or Congress, but he had still sought and received support from both institutions.[133]
In the war on terrorism, as a result of the Bush’s ineffective neoconservative foreign policies and the failure of the world to accept American benevolent hegemony, the United States cannot rely heavily on its hard power. The war on terrorism is a clear example of the interplay of the hard power and soft power. To defeat the terrorists in the long term, the United States must learn to combine both soft power and hard power to form a more effective foreign policy.[134] In the words of the Financial Times, “To win the peace, therefore, the United States will have to show as much skill in exercising soft power as it has in using hard power to win the war.”[135] Consequently, the United States needs to reconceptualize its foreign policy in several fundamental ways.
In the first instance, the Bush Administration needs to realize that the key to bring about peace in the long war is winning “hearts and minds.”[136] Certainly, military power is a crucial part of the response to terrorism. Some neoconservative proponents of Bush Administration say that soft power has played a minor role in the current “war on terror.” They argued that Osama Bin Laden and his followers are repelled, not attracted, by American culture, values, and policies. Moreover, American military power was the vital means in defeating the Taliban government in Afghanistan and ousting Saddam Hussein.[137]
In contrast, the neoconservatives’ argument is partly true because it explains only half of the whole answer.[138] The Bush Administration assumed that punishing states that sponsor terrorism can solve the problem. Such punitive measure might help, but in the end they cannot stop individuals who have already gained access to destructive technology.[139] The success of the information revolution is providing inexpensive means of communication and organization that let the Islamic extremists have bad influence on others who find them compelling and attractive. It has now become evident that terrorists are more lethal and more agile.[140] They can utilize their tools of globalization such as the internet, mobile communications, the media, and funds for fulfilling their aims.[141] In the late 1990s, the number of jihadist websites has increased dramatically from a dozen to more than 4,500 today. Such websites not only recruit the terrorists but also train them.[142] The threat of terrorism does not come from only one person or a hierarchical or coherent organization. The coherence of the transnational terrorism rather lies in the ideas which have been propagated by people like Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri.[143]
In the battlefield of ideas, the United States’ ability to attract moderates is critical to victory. The United States will win only if moderate Muslims win.[144] Top priority for the Bush Administration must be countering the widespread anti-American sentiment, especially in the Muslim and Arab world. About 1.2 billion of Muslim are not yet implacable enemies of the United States. The Bush Administration needs to win their hearts and minds.[145] As Nye said, “If you can get others to be attracted, to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks.”[146]
The next argument is that the Bush Administration needs to pay more concern on eliminating poverty. It is true that the United States’ economic policies are not directly connected to the war on terrorism. However, its economic policies have an effect on America’s soft power.[147] On one hand, development assistance cannot eliminate the roots of terrorism because most of the terrorists who have fought the United States are not poor.[148] On the other hand, terrorist actions are often taken by people who declare to fight in the name of the poor and then recruit them to violent causes. As Colin Powell, former United States Secretary of State, said, “The United States cannot win the war on terrorism unless we confront the social and political roots of poverty.” [149] The United States can lessen such demand and enhance its soft power by aligning its economic policies with the aspirations of ordinary people in poor countries. The Bush Administration needs to take the interests of poor countries into greater account. For example, Bush committed to boost development assistance and to spend an extra $10 billion to combat aids in Africa and the Caribbean. This policy is not only right for humanitarian reasons, but it is also a wise investment in increasing legitimacy, a source of American soft power.[150]
The final policy that needs rethinking, and the one that will be the most contested, is the place of unilateralism in American foreign policy. The Bush’s “go-it-alone” approach was a mistake.[151] Certainly, military power remains important in the war on terrorism, but it is also important to mobilize international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges. No country is great enough to solve the problem of global terrorism alone.[152] There are many factors that lie outside America’s control. The reaction to the terrorist attacks on the United States is complicated. The United States needs an international cooperation attempt for winning the threat of international terrorism.[153]
Victory over the terrorist cells throughout the world depends on close civilian cooperation across borders, whether that means the cooperation of intelligence service in many countries, coordinating police work across borders, or tracking global financial flows.[154] For example, finance warfare came out as a key mechanism of anti-terrorist strategy. Although, the United States is the strongest economic power, it cannot go itself alone to do the financial war in the context of global capital market. The United States required active international cooperation to tackle this problem.[155]
In case of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the solutions of reconstruction in both countries are very costly and difficult. Although many countries believed that stabilizing post-war Iraq was vitally important for regional stability, international security, and their own national safety, they did not rush to join the reconstruction effort.[156] In 2003, American troops constituted more than 90 percent of all forces supporting the Iraq operation at annual cost of $50 billion. Rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq would have been best accomplished by working with others, but most countries agreed to contribute troops only after the United States agreed to help pay for them.[157] Without doubt, when the United States discount the importance of its attractiveness to other countries, it pays the price[158] The invasion and occupation of Iraq would be only modestly easier and less expensive if Bush had mobilized a broad coalition of countries to help.[159] The clear lesson is that American foreign policy should be based on a blend of power and international cooperation.[160] In practical term, the United States should insist that the obligations entailed in its alliances be renewed.[161]
Conclusion
Almost five centuries ago, Niccolò Machiavelli, a key figure in realist political theory, advised princes in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved. In today’s world, it is best to be both.[162] However, the United States is likely to be neither.[163]
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush doctrine correctly identified the challenges growing out the deep changes in the world that were illuminated.[164] However, the Bush Administration has failed to implement the doctrine most effectively. It was clear that Bush’s neoconservative foreign affairs and defense policies, focused on pre-emption, unilateralism, and hegemony, severely destroyed American soft power.[165]
Some neoconservatives believed in the motto as “Let them hate as long as they fear.”[166] However, Bush overestimated American power in the world. The United States was not an omnipotent nation. The irony of American power is that world politics is changing in a way that makes it impossible for the United States to achieve its national interests alone.[167] The threats, challenging America whether defeating terrorism, reversing weapons proliferation, promoting economic prosperity, safeguarding political liberty, sustaining the global environment, or halting the spread of killer diseases could not be solved by unilateralism.[168] The Bush Administration’s ability cannot depend on identifying and pursuing only American interest. It still required the cooperation of others.[169]
To win the war on terrorism, using only hard power cannot produce success, and its use can sometimes be counterproductive.[170] The decline of American soft power makes the United States neither strong nor benign.[171] The first requirement for the Bush Administration is to reconceptualize its foreign policy. The United States should pay more attention to increasing its soft power. The attractiveness of the United States is a crucial ability to achieve the outcomes it wants. The United States needs to make people around the world to trust in the legitimacy of the United States.[172] When American foreign policies are accepted as legitimate in the world, American soft power is enhanced. This means strategies to influence others to admire the United States and want what American want.[173]


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[3] AJ Blinken, ‘Winning the War of Ideas’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, 2002, pp. 101-114.
[4] Joseph S. Nye is recognized as one of the top ten most influential scholars who have had the greatest impact on the field of international relations.
S Peterson, MJ Tierney & D Maliniak, ‘Teaching and Research Practices, Views on the Discipline, and Policy Attitudes of International Relations Faculty at U.S. Colleges and Universities,’ College of William and Mary, Williamsburg VA, August 2005. http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/intlpolitics/teaching/surveyreport.pdf , viewed 29 May 2006.
[5] JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004, p. XIII.
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[7] GW Bush, President Discusses Iraqi Elections, Victory in the War on Terror, The White House, 14 December 2005.
[8] ‘Newsmaker: Gen. John Abizaid’, Onlinenewshour, 4 March 2004, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june04/abizaid_3-04.html, viewed 20 May 2006.
[9] GW Bush, State of the Union address by the President, The White House, 31 January 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/, viewed 20 May 2006.
[10] AF Krepinevich, ‘How to win in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 5, 2005, pp. 87-104.
[11] GP Herd, ‘The Causes and Consequences of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Conflict Studies Research Centre, August 2004, http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/middle_east/04(22)-GPH.pdf , viewed 29 May 2006.
[12] JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004, p.XII.
[13] JS Nye Jr., ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no.2, 2004, pp. 255-270.
[14] ibid
[15] JS Nye Jr., ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no.2, 2004, pp. 255-270.
[16] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003.
[17] ibid
[18] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[19] F Fukuyama, ‘Good ends, bad means’, guardianweekly, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,,1721540,00.html, viewed 29 May 2006.
[20] JS Nye Jr., ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no.2, 2004, pp. 255-270.
[21] R Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Routledge, New York, 2005.
[22] ibid
[23] JS Nye Jr., ‘When Hard Power Undermines Soft Power’, New Perspectives Quarterly, vol.21, issue 3, 2004, pp.13-15.
[24] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 2003.
[25] R Jervis, ‘Understand the Bush Doctrine’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, 2003, pp. 365-388.
[26] R Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no.3 2005, pp. 351-377.
[27] RW Tucker & DC Hendrickson, ‘The Source of American Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no.6, 2004, pp. 18-32.
[28] ‘US rejects germ warfare plan’, BBC News, 25 July 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1456088.stm,viewed 16 May 2006.
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[30] RW Tucker & DC Hendrickson, ‘The Source of American Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no.6, 2004, pp. 18-32.
[31] E Fourie & I Davis, ‘Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: a View from Venus’, British American Security Information Council, 23 December 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[32]W Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Continum, New York, 2003, p. 161.
[33] Cited in RG Kaiser, ‘U.S. Risks Isolation, Breakdown of Old Alliances in Case of War’, The Washington Post, 16 March 2003, p. A12.
[34] E Fourie & I Davis, ‘Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: a View from Venus’, British American Security Information Council, 23 December 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[35] ‘Statement of Principles’, The Project for the New American Century, 3 June 1997, http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm, viewed 19 May 2006.
[36] C Krauthammer, ‘American Unilateralism’, Revista Guaracabuya, 4 December 2002, http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagim015.php, viewed 21 May 2006.
[37] ibid
[38] ibid
[39] ‘Fukuyama Withdraws Bush Support’, zaman.com, 14 July 2004, http://www.zaman.com/?bl=international&alt=&trh=20040714&hn=10372, viewed 21 May 2006.
[40] F Fukuyama, ‘Why shouldn’t I change my mind?’ Los Angeles Times, 9 April 2006,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-opfukuyama9apr09,1,2307957.story?ctrack=1&c, viewed 21 May 2006.
[41] F Fukuyama, ‘I was a neocon. I was wrong’, Times online, 19 March 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,27709-2094760,00.html, viewed 24 May 2006.
[42] F Fukuyama, ‘Why shouldn’t I change my mind?’ Los Angeles Times, 9 April 2006, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-op fukuyama9apr09,1,2307957.story?ctrack=1&c, viewed 21 May 2006.
[43] DC Hendrickson, ‘Toward Universal Empire: The Dangerous Quest for Absolute Security’, World Policy Journal, vol. 19, fall 2002, www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj02-3/hendrickson.html, viewed 30 May 2006.
[44] R Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 7.
[45] JL Gaddis, ‘After Containment’, New Republic, 25 April 2005, vol. 232, issue 15, p. 28.
[46] R Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 136.
[47] Ibid, p.105.
[48] JS Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002.
[49] JS Nye Jr., ‘U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 60-73.
[50] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[51] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003.
[52] GW Bush, President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, The White House, 1 June 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html, viewed 19 May 2006.
[53] DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/, viewed 29 May 2006.
[54] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html, viewed 29 May 2006.
[55] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003, p.121.
[56] ibid, p.122.
[57] JS Nye Jr., ‘U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 60-73.
[58] PD Wolfowitz, Wolfowitz interview with the San Francisco Chronicle, The United States Department of Defense, 23 February 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02272002_t0223sf.html, viewed 3 June 2006.
[59] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003.
[60] JL Gaddis, ‘After Containment’, New Republic, 25 April 2005, vol. 232, issue 15, p. 28.
[61] GW Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, The White House, 20 September 2001.
[62] E Fourie & I Davis, ‘Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: a View from Venus’, British American Security Information Council, 23 December 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[63] E Fourie & I Davis, ‘Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: a View from Venus’, British American Security Information Council, 23 December 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[64] Cited in IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003, p.126.
[65] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003, p.126-127.
[66] ibid
[67] B Russett, ‘Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace’, International Studies Perspectives, vol.6, 2005, pp. 395-408.
[68] ibid
[69] Cited in R Jervis, ‘Understand the Bush Doctrine’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, 2003, pp.365-388.
[70] R Jervis, ‘Understand the Bush Doctrine’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, 2003, pp.365-388.
[71] ibid
[72] F Fukuyama & A Garfinkle, ‘A Better Idea’, The Wall Street Journal Asia, 29 March 2006, p.15.
[73] R Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 80.
[74] R Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Routledge, New York, 2005.
[75] T Carothers, ‘Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1, 2003, pp. 84-97.
[76] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003.
[77] GW. Bush, ‘State of the Union Address’, USA-Presidents.Info, 29 January 2002.
[78] C Forster, ‘Democracy, Terrorism and the Middle East’, The Foreign Policy Centre, 16 February 2006, http://fpc.org.uk/articles/347, viewed 29 May 2006.
[79] E Fourie & I Davis, ‘Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: a View from Venus’, British American Security Information Council, 23 December 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[80] E Fourie & I Davis, ‘Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: a View from Venus’, British American Security Information Council, 23 December 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[81] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no.3, 2004, pp. 16-20.
[82] Cited in B Russett, ‘Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace’, International Studies Perspectives, vol.6, 2005, pp. 395-408.
[83] ibid
[84] C Forster, ‘Democracy, Terrorism and the Middle East’, The Foreign Policy Centre, 16 February 2006, http://fpc.org.uk/articles/347, viewed 29 May 2006.
[85] C Forster, ‘Democracy, Terrorism and the Middle East’, The Foreign Policy Centre, 16 February 2006, pp. 1-4, http://fpc.org.uk/articles/347, viewed 29 May 2006.
[86] N Chomsky, ‘Drain the Swamp and There Will Be No More Mosquitoes’, The Guardian, 9 September 2002, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20020909.htm, viewed 1 June 2006.
[87] N Chomsky, ‘The United States is a Leading Terrorist State’, Monthly Review, vol. 53, no. 6, November 2001, http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/200111--02.htm, viewed 6 May 2006.
[88] F Zakaria, ‘The Arrogant Empire’, Newsweek US Edition, 23 June 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3068616/, viewed 26 May 2006.
[89] PV Ness, ‘China’s response to the Bush Doctrine’, World Policy Journal, vol. 21, winter 2004, vol. 21, issue 4, pp. 38-48.
[90] E Fourie & I Davis, ‘Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: a View from Venus’, British American Security Information Council, 23 December 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[91] ibid
[92] Cited in E Fourie & I Davis, ‘Neoconservatism and US Foreign Policy: a View from Venus’, British American Security Information Council, 23 December 2004, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/2004nc02.htm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[93] JS Nye Jr., ‘Ignoring Soft Power Carries a High Cost’, The John F. Kennedy School of Government, 16 May 2004, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2004/nye_softpower_chitrib_051604.htm, viewed 30 May 2006.
[94] T Dunne, ‘When the shooting starts’: Atlanticism in British security strategy’, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 5, 2004, pp. 811-833.
[95] F Fukuyama, ‘After Neoconservatism’, New York Times Magazine, 9 February 2006, vol.155, issue 52495, pp. 62-67.
[96] Cited in T Dunne, ‘When the shooting starts’: Atlanticism in British security strategy’, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 5, 2004, pp. 811-833.
[97] RN Taylor, ‘Guantanamo is symbol of injustice, says Goldsmith’, The Guardian, 11 May 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,,1772226,00.html, viewed 4 June 2006.
[98] T Golden, ‘In U.S. Reports, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates’ Deaths’, The New York Times, 20 May 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html, viewed 4 June 2006.
[99] D Jehl, ‘G.I. in Abu Ghraib Abuse is spared time in jail’, The New York Times, 3 November 2004, p. 16.
[100] RW Tucker & DC Hendrickson, ‘The Source of American Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no.6, 2004, pp. 18-32.
[101] ibid
[102] Cited in JS Nye Jr., ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no.3, 2004, pp. 16-20.
[103] R Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no.3 2005, pp.351-377.
[104] R Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no.3 2005, pp.351-377.
[105] S Sachs, Poll Finds Hostility Hardening Toward U.S. Policies’, The New York Times, 17 March
2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/17/international/17PEW.htm, viewed 30 May 2006.
[106] ibid
[107] M Lynch, ‘Taking Arabs Seriously’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 5, 2003, pp.81-94.
[108] ‘Against All Enemies, by Richard Clarke: on War & Peace’, On the Issues, http://www.ontheissues.org/Archive/Against_All_Enemies_War_+_Peace.htm, viewed 31 May 2006.
[109] S Sachs, Poll Finds Hostility Hardening Toward U.S. Policies’, The New York Times, 17 March
2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/17/international/17PEW.html, viewed 30 May 2006.
[110] Cited in S Nossel, ‘Smart Power’, Foreign Affairs, vol.83, no.2, 2004, pp. 131-142.
[111] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003.
[112] F Fukuyama, ‘After Neoconservatism’, New York Times Magazine, 9 February 2006, vol.155, issue 52495, pp. 62-67.
[113] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003.
[114] J Shovelan, ‘Bush warns war will continue’, The World Today, 12 October 2001, http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s389526.htm, viewed 3 June 2006.
[115] Cited in IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003, p.194.
[116] JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, Public Affairs, New York, 2004.
[117] Cited in JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, Public Affairs, New York, 2004, p. IX.
[118] S Tisdall & E Macaskill, ‘America’s Long War’, The Guardian, 15 February 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1710062,00.html, viewed 7 June 2006.
[119] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[120] SR Sloan, RG, Sutter & CA, Yost, The Use of U.S. Power: Implications for U.S. Interests, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2004, http://isd.georgetown.edu/Use_of_US_Power.pdf, viewed 7 June 2006.
[121] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003, p.197.
[122] ‘Iraq Body Count: War dead figures’, BBC News, 15 May 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4525412.stm, viewed 20 May 2006.
[123] F Fukuyama, ‘Why shouldn't I change my mind?’, Los Angeles Times, 9 April 2006, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-op fukuyama9apr09,1,2307957.story?ctrack=1&c, viewed 21 May 2006.
[124] JS Nye Jr., ‘Ignoring Soft Power Carries a High Cost’, The John F. Kennedy School of Government, 16 May 2004, http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2004/nye_softpower_chitrib_051604.htm, viewed 30 May 2006.
[125] N Chomsky, ‘Drain the Swamp and There Will Be No More Mosquitoes’, The Guardian, 9 September 2002, http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20020909.htm, viewed 1 June 2006.
[126] R Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no.3 2005, pp.351-377.
[127] ‘Clarke’s Take on Terror’, CBS News, 21 March 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/19/60minutes/main607356.shtml, viewed 1 June 2006.
[128] GP Herd, ‘The Causes and Consequences of Strategic Failure in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Conflict Studies Research Centre, August 2004, http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/middle_east/04(22)-GPH.pdf , viewed 29 May 2006.
[129] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2003, p.187.
[130] ibid
[131] JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004, p. 61.
[132] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[133] RW Tucker & DC Hendrickson, ‘The Source of American Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no.6, 2004, pp. 18-32.
[134] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[135] JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004, p.XI.
[136] JJ Carafano, P, Rosenzweig & R Robblee, ‘Winning the Long War: A Study Guide for Understanding the Public Policy Challenges of the War on Terrorism’, The Heritage Foundation, 8 September 2005, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/sr04.cfm, viewed 7 June 2006.
[137] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[138] ibid
[139] JS Nye Jr., ‘U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp.60-73.
[140] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[141] ibid
[142] JS Nye Jr., ‘How to Counter Terrorism’s Online Generation’, The Financial Time, 13 October 2005.
[143] ‘I was a neocon. I was wrong’, Times online, 19 March 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,27709-2094760,00.html, viewed 24 May 2006.
[144] JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004, p. 6.
[145] F Fukuyama, ‘The Neoconservative Moment’, The National Interest, 2004, pp. 57-68.
[146] JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004, p. 6.
[147] T Plate, ‘Guns alone won’t win war on terrorism’, San Francisco Chronicle, 26 May 2002,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2002/05/26/ED38538.DTL, viewed 8 June 2006.
[148]AB Krueger & J Malecková, ‘Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?’, New Republic, 24 June 2002, vol. 226, issue 24, pp. 27-33.
[149] C Powell, ‘No Country Left Behind’, Foreign Policy, issue 146, 2005, pp. 28-35.
[150] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[151] S Chapman, ‘Bush’s Bad Foreign Policy: Unilateralism and remaking the world don’t mix’, Reason, February 2004, http://www.reason.com/0402/cr.sc.bushs.shtml, viewed 3 June 2006.
[152] JS Nye Jr., ‘Why military power is no longer enough’, The Observer, 31 March 2002,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,676169,00.html, viewed 9 June 2006.
[153] S Chapman, ‘Bush’s Bad Foreign Policy: Unilateralism and remaking the world don’t mix’, Reason, February 2004, http://www.reason.com/0402/cr.sc.bushs.shtml, viewed 3 June 2006.
[154] R Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, Routledge, New York, 2005, p. 105.
[155] MS Navias, ‘Finance Warfare and International Terrorism’ in L Freedman (ed), Superterrorism policy response, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2002.
[156] ibid
[157] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 2003.
[158] JS Nye Jr., Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics and American Foreign Policy, PublicAffairs, New York, 2004.
[159] S Chapman, ‘Bush’s Bad Foreign Policy: Unilateralism and remaking the world don’t mix’, Reason, February 2004, http://www.reason.com/0402/cr.sc.bushs.shtml, viewed 3 June 2006.
[160] ibid, p.197.
[161] S Nossel, ‘Smart Power’, Foreign Affairs, vol.83, no.2, 2004, pp. 131-142.
[162] JS Nye Jr., ‘The Velvet Hegemon’, Foreign Policy, May 2003, Issue 136, pp. 73-74.
[163] R Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no.3 2005, pp. 351-377.
[164] JS Nye Jr., ‘U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 60-73.
[165] RW Tucker & DC Hendrickson, ‘The Source of American Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no.6, 2004, pp. 18-32.
[166] E Abrahamian, ‘our neoconservatives are as radical as they boast and an even greater danger than Walt realizes’, Boston Review, February/March 2005, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.1/abrahamian.html, viewed 30 May 2006.
[167] JS Nye Jr., ‘U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no.4, 2003, pp. 60-73.
[168] IH Daalder & JM Lindsay, American Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C, 2003, p.196.
[169] JS Nye Jr., ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no.2, 2004, pp. 255-270.
[170] ibid
[171] R Jervis, ‘Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 120, no.3 2005, pp. 351-377.
[172] R Clarke, ‘Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror’, Center for Global Studies, the University of Illinois, 8 March 2005, http://www.cgs.uiuc.edu/resources/webvideo/index.html, viewed 30 May 2006.
[173] JS Nye Jr., ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no.2, 2004, pp. 255-270.